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The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive
General Liability Policies: Reasons for
Interpretations in Favor of Coverage in 1996 and
Beyond
The events affecting the coverage claims before us span a period of
several decades, in the course of which societal indifference concerning
environmental pollution damage has been supplanted by a heightened
awareness of the need for environmentally-sound waste-disposal practices
and an increasingly aggressive governmental effort to remediate the con-
sequences of past environmental damages. That evolution understandably
has influenced the insurance industry's concern about its exposure for
damages caused by environmental pollution, and has resulted in an in-
dustry-wide determination to modify the scope of insurance coverage for
such damages.
The claims for coverage involve Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) policies covering plaintiff and its predecessors during the [1960's
and 1970's] issued by... a large number of... carriers.... [N]o dispute
exists concerning the language of the critical provisions that affect the
question of coverage. Because the policies are essentially standardized,
industry-wide forms, our interpretation of their coverage provisions may
affect significantly the allocation of damages for environmental pollution
of... property among insurance carriers, industry and government.'
INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the introduction of Superfund in 1980,2 the
federal government and the states have cast a broad net of strict,
joint and retroactive liability over business, industry and even
individuals in an effort to marshall resources to pay for the
daunting task of environmental remediation. Parties caught in
this net have frequently turned to their third-party liability in-
surance carriers for coverage under Comprehensive General Lia-
1. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 833-34 (N.J.
1993) (Stein, J.), cert. denied sub nom. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Morton Intl, 114
S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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bility ("CGL") policies. Because the collective cleanup liability is
estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars, insurers
just as frequently dispute environmental claims. The defense
most commonly raised by insurers in environmental coverage
litigation is the "pollution exclusion," a clause which was almost
universally included in CGL policies written from 1970 through
1986. Jurisdictions are split on the interpretation of the scope of
the clause. However, reported decisions have become increasingly
pro-insurer over the last few years. Many jurisdictions have yet
to decide the issue, and billions of dollars in environmental cover-
age claims are potentially at stake, turning on the construction
that courts may ascribe to a few critical words.
This comment, in response to the recent trend of pro-insurer
decisions on the pollution exclusion, refines the classic pro-policy-
holder arguments using recent legal trends and insurance indus-
try developments. It argues that a pro-coverage interpretation of
the pollution exclusion is supported by modern contract law,
equity and public policy.
Part I of this comment provides the history and background of
environmental liabilities in the United States and describes the
role of insurance. It also highlights the financial stakes of envi-
ronmental coverage claims, reporting the most recent estimates
of the ultimate environmental cleanup and transactions costs.
Part II analyzes the various interpretive disputes surrounding
the pollution exclusion and demonstrates the sharp split of au-
thority. Part III describes the history of the development of the
CGL policy and the pollution exclusion. Part IV reviews the clas-
sic theories supporting a pro-coverage interpretation of the pollu-
tion exclusion--contra insurer, estoppel and public policy-yet
does so in light of modern movements in contract law as well as
recent developments in the insurance industry.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES AND INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. Environmental Cleanup Liability
In 1980, in the waning days of his administration, President
Carter signed into law the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or
"Superfund).' The law represented the federal response to na-
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675. See Remarks on Signing H.R. 7020 Into Law (Dec. 11, 1980), in III
PUB. PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES-JIMMY CARTER 1980-1981
2797 (1982).
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tional concerns raised by several high profile toxic contamination
sites such as Love Canal, in Niagara Falls, New York and the
"Valley of the Drums" in Shepardsville, Kentucky.4 The ambi-
tious goal of the law was to clean up hazardous sites throughout
the United States which had been contaminated by historic waste
disposal and toxic chemical management practices.' CERCLA
established two primary mechanisms for implementation of the
Superfund program: (1) a federal fund," currently financed by a
combination of taxes on petroleum,7 chemical feedstocks' and
corporate income,' appropriations from general revenues," and
certain costs and penalties recovered by the federal govern-
ment;1" and (2) a liability scheme under which the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA") can recover
remediation costs from and order cleanups by Potentially Respon-
sible Parties ("PRP's"). 2 PRP's may include current site owners
and operators, past site owners and operators, offsite generators
of wastes, and waste transporters. 3
The sweep of CERCLA's liability scheme is broad and was
unprecedented at the time of the law's passage in 1980. CERCLA
liability is strict' 4 -PRP's may be liable for contamination
caused by state of the art waste management practices which are
in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations, and fur-
ther may be held liable for conduct of their predecessors in inter-
est 5 and third party waste contractors. 6 CERCLA liability is
joint and several' 7-- a PRP may be liable for the cleanup costs
4. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-21, reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-23.
5. Id.
6. For the establishment of the Hazardous Substances Superfund and the
enumerations of transfers to and expenditures from the fund, see 26 U.S.C. § 9507
(1994).
7. 26 U.S.C. § 4611 (1994).
8. Id. §§ 4661, 4671.
9. Id. § 59A.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
11. 26 U.S.C. § 9507(b)(2)-(5) (1994).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).
13. Id. § 9607(a). CERCLA liability also depends on complex and well-litigated
definitions of the terms "facility," "release" and "hazardous substances." See id. These
subtleties of CERCLA liability are unimportant for the purposes of this comment.
Therefore, this comment will use terms such as "site," "property," "contamination,"
"waste," "toxic chemicals," "pollution," etc. No technical or legal concepts are intended
by such terms-they are to be understood in their common vernacular usage.
14. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
15. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. Lefton Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d
321, 325 (7th Cir. 1994).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 969-70 (C.D.
Cal. 1993).
17. O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub
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for an entire site, yet have only contributed a small amount of
waste. CERCLA liability is retroactive1S--PRP's can be held lia-
ble for conduct that occurred long before the dawn of Superfund.
Sites to be remediated under the Superfund program are
placed on the National Priorities List (the "NPL"), which is in-
tended to be a list of the very worst contaminated sites in the
United States."9 However, CERCLA is not the only law under
which parties can incur liability for site cleanup.2" Other federal
remediation liability provisions include sections 3004(u), 3008(h)
and 7003 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act21 and section 311 of
the Clean Water Act.22 Additionally, after the enactment of
CERCLA, many states established their own Superfund-like
programs to address sites which the EPA did not list on the
NPL.' As of 1993, forty-three states had established such pro-
grams."
B. The Role of Insurance
Parties which have incurred cleanup liability under these
broad statutes have sought to offset some of their losses by turn-
ing to their insurance carriers for coverage. Such claims are often
made under Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") policies,25
nom. American Cyanamid Co. v. O'Neil, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
18. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,
732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 300.4 (1995) (defining NPL).
For the current NPL, see 40 C.F.R. § 300 app. B (1995). For the EPA's Hazard
Ranking System, which is the method whereby the EPA makes NPL listing deci-
sions, see id. § 300 app. A. Through 1995, the EPA had identified over 40,000 sites
in the United States as potential candidates for inclusion on the NPL. INSURANCE
SERVICES OFFICE, INC., SUPERFUND AND THE INSURANCE ISSUES SURROUNDING ABAN-
DONED HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 8-10 & fig. 2 (1995) (citations omitted) [hereinafter
ISO REPORT). As of November, 1995, the EPA had listed a total of 1,374 such sites
since 1980, 84 of which have been deleted, leaving a net of 1,290 sites. Id. at 14
tbl. 4 (citations omitted).
20. This comment refers to sites on the NPL as NPL sites, and refers to sites
for which cleanup liability is imposed under other federal or state programs as non-
NPL sites.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6924(u), 6928(h), 6973 (1988) (respectively). This statute is
also known as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
23. RIDGWAY M. HALL, JR. ET AL., SUPERFUND MANUAi-LEGAL AND MANAGE-
MENT STRATEGIES § 11.2, at 11-7 (1993).
24. HALL, supra note 23, § 11.2, at 11-7. For a table of the state Superfund-
like statutes, their statutory authority and lead agency contacts, see id. § 11.2, at
11-28 to 11-43.
25. See GRACE A. CARTER & KEITH A. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE
HANDBOOK § 3.2.1, at 30 (1992). CGL policies provide the policyholder with broad
coverage for a variety of liabilities that it may incur to third parties. Id. In 1986,
the title of the standard CGL policy was changed to "Commercial General Liability."
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which are frequently purchased by business enterprises. 26 The
standard CGL policy provides that "[the insurer] will pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of... bodily injury
or... property damage to which this [policy] applies, caused by
an occurrence."27 This is referred to as an occurrence-based poli-
cy because the insured is covered if the occurrence happens with-
in the policy period, even if the claim arises after the policy peri-
od. 8 This is contrasted with a claims-made policy which covers
the insured if the insured makes a claim for damages within the
policy period.29
An occurrence is defined in the standard CGL policy as "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expect-
ed nor intended from the standpoint of the insured."" In 1970, a
new exclusion was added to the standard CGL policy which is
commonly referred to as the "pollution exclusion.""' The pollu-
tion exclusion reads:
This insurance does not apply...
(f) to bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dis-
persal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
toxic chemicals, liquids or gasses, waste materials or other irritants, con-
taminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.'
EDWARD J. ZULKEY, BUSINESS LIABILITY INSURANCE-LITIGATION, ARBITRATION AND
SETTLEMENT § 1.08, at 1-18 n.113. Both the pre-1986 and the post-1986 policies are
generally referred to as CGL policies, and are accordingly so referenced throughout
this comment.
See infra Part III for a history of the development of the standard CGL
policy.
26. ROWLAND H. LONG, 2 THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11A.01, at 11A-
3 (1992) (citations omitted).
27. 1973 Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policy, reprinted in TOD I.
ZUCKERMAN & MARK C. RASKOFF, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE LITIGATION PRACTICE
FORMS Form VI-2, at VI-23 (1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1973 CGL Policy].
28. CARTER & MEYER, supra note 25, § 3.2.2, at 32.
29. Id. § 3.2.2, at 33. In 1986, the insurance industry introduced a standard
claims-made CGL policy. Id. § 3.2.2, at 32-33. However, for the purpose of this com-
ment, the only relevant CGL policies are those issued prior to 1986.
30. 1973 CGL Policy, supra note 27, at VI-20.
31. Robert S. Soderstrom, The Role of Insurance in Environmental Litigation,
11 FORUM 762, 766 & n,19 (1976). In 1970, the clause was introduced as a manda-
tory endorsement, and in 1973 was incorporated into the policy itself as exclusionary
clause "f." Id. at 766-68.
32. 1973 CGL Policy, supra note 27, at VI-23. This clause is also commonly
referred to as the "qualified pollution exclusion," the "conditional pollution exclusion,"
or the "sudden and accidental pollution exclusion" in order to differentiate it from
1996 Comments 1087
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The pollution exclusion was universally included in CGL poli-
cies issued to insureds from 1970 until 1986, at which time it
was replaced by the "absolute pollution exclusion."3 3 The abso-
lute pollution exclusion does not include an exception for "sudden
and accidental" discharges, and has been almost uniformly held
to be an absolute bar to coverage for environmental claims.'
However, because the standard CGL policy is an occurrence-
based policy, the pollution exclusion contained in CGL policies
written from 1970 through 1986 still has great relevance to
the "absolute pollution exclusion." Throughout this comment, this clause is referred
to simply as the "pollution exclusion." When referencing the absolute pollution exclu-
sion, this comment will uses the term "absolute pollution exclusion."
33. Michelle I. Schaffer, The Evolution of the Pollution Exclusion: From "Sud-
den and Accidental" to Absolute and Unambiguous, in REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE
COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY: COVERAGE PROVISIONS, EXCLUSIONS, AND
OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES 209, 225 (1995). The absolute pollution exclusion reads:
This insurance does not apply to:
f.(1) "Bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of the actual, alleged or
threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants:
(a) At or from premises you own, rent or occupy;
(b) At or from any site or location used by or for you or others for the
handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment of waste;
(c) Which are at any time transported, handled, stored, treated, disposed
of, or processed as waste by or for you or any person or organization for
whom you may be legally responsible; or
(d) At or from any site or location on which you or any contractors or
subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are perform-
ing operations:
(i) if the pollutants are brought on or to the site or location in
connection with such operations; or
(ii) if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, remove,
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize pollutants.
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant,
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste
includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.
Id. at 225-26.
34. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 522
& n.8 (Tex. 1995) ("This pollution exclusion is just what it purports to
be-absolute.") (quoting Alcolac Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1546,
1549 (D. Md. 1989)). See also Schaffer, supra note 33, at 228-32. See Steven A.
Miller & Julianne L. Swilley, The Absolute Pollution Exclusion in General Liability
Insurance Policies, in REFERENCE HANDBOOK ON THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIA-
BILITY POLICY: COVERAGE PROVISIONS, EXCLUSIONS, AND OTHER LITIGATION ISSUES
145 (1995).
The primary interpretive issue currently developing in the courts regarding
the absolute pollution exclusion focuses on its applicability to personal injury from
exposure to toxic substances in situations outside the classical setting of contami-
nation of environmental media. See, e.g., Stoney Run Co. v. Prudential-LMI Commer-
cial Ins. Co., 47 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 1995) (carbon monoxide poisoning in the home);
Essex Ins. Co. v. Avondale Mills, Inc., 639 So. 2d 1339 (Ala. 1994) (occupational as-
bestos exposure); Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617 (Md. 1995) (childhood
lead poisoning from ingestion of paint chips in the home).
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today's coverage claims for environmental damages arising out of
occurrences which happened in that decade and a half.
C. Resources, Transaction Costs and Claim Disputes
The stakes in the environmental cost allocation game between
policyholders and their insurers could not be higher. In the early
1990's, estimates of the total cost of cleanup for all contaminated
sites in the United States (NPL and non-NPL) were estimated in
the range of 150 billion to one trillion dollars.5 Current best
estimates are a bit lower, at anywhere from 80 to 167 billion dol-
lars for NPL sites36 and 75 billion dollars for non-NPL sites.37
35. See Thomas M. Reiter et al., The Pollution Exclusion Under Ohio Law:
Staying the Course, 59 CINCINNATI L. REV. 1165, 1171 & n.30 (1991).
36. A.M. BEST CO., P/C INDUSTRY BEGINS TO FACE ENVIRONMENTAL AND AS-
BESTOS LIABILITIES 8 exhibit 6 (1996) (collecting mid-range estimates of five recent
studies) [hereinafter BEST REPORT]. The A.M. Best Company analyzes the insurance
industry and publishes ratings and other financial information. Id. at 26.
37. BEST REPORT, supra note 36, at 10. It is this author's opinion that the re-
cent political movement toward smaller, more cost-effective government and an in-
creasing consensus that Superfund is not fair, does not work and costs too much is
the ultimate factor influencing the reductions in the cost estimates. For a critique of
the Superfund liability system and its resultant inefficiencies and inequities, see
generally Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1
(1993). For a critique of the Superfund cleanup remedy selection process, see gener-
ally Robert H. Abrams, Using Experience to Improve Superfund Remedy Selection, 29
U. RICH. L. REV. 581 (1995).
As evidence of the trend toward a less costly national environmental cleanup
program, note that the addition of new sites to the NPL by the EPA has slowed
appreciably in recent years-in the six years between 1983 and 1989, the number of
sites on the NPL grew from zero to 1,224, but in the following six year period, the
number of NPL sites increased only from 1,224 to 1,290. ISO REPORT, supra note
19, at 10 fig. 3 (citations omitted). The A.M. Best Company has recently estimated
the ultimate number of NPL sites at 2,100-down from its 1994 estimate of 4,600.
BEST REPORT, supra note 36, at 8 exhibit 6.
Superfund reform initiatives have been introduced in both the 103d and
104th Congresses. See Superfund Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 3800, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994); Reform of Superfund Act of 1995, H.R. 2500, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). These bills include reforms in the liability scheme as well as provisions for
more cost-effective remedy selections. See also H.R. 3800 §§ 401-413, 501-506; H.R.
2500 §§ 201-216, 102 (respectively). Although no bill has passed as of the writing of
this comment, the consensus of Congress-and what it perceives to be the consensus
of its constituents-is toward a more cost-effective environmental cleanup program.
State lawmakers are also responding to this consensus with what is common-
ly referred to as "Brownfields" programs which are designed to encourage cleanup
and reuse of industrial sites through less onerous liability provisions and cleanup
standards. See James W. Creenan & John Q. Lewis, Pennsylvania's Land Recycling
Program: Solving the Brownfields Problem with Remediation Standards and Limited
Liability, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 661, 673-74 & n.71 (1996).
It is perhaps these trends which have influenced the AM. Best Company to
reduce its 1996 estimate of total NPL cleanup costs to 54-108 billion dollars, down
from its 1994 estimate of 120-600 billion dollars. BEST REPORT, supra note 36, at 8
exhibit 6.
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The United States insurance industry's share of this tab is cur-
rently estimated at between forty-eight and ninety-one billion
dollars, with a best estimate of sixty-six billion dollars. 8
Not only is the size of the cleanup bill daunting, but unfortu-
nately much of it is spent on excessive transaction costs associat-
ed with assigning environmental liability. Transaction costs are
the monies spent by various stakeholders-governments, PRP's,
insurers and the community-contesting and allocating liability
amongst themselves. 9 The Rand Institute for Civil Justice has
estimated that transaction costs constitute thirty-two percent of
all money spent by private sector PRP's through 1991 in man-
aging Superfund liabilities.' For insurers, however, the transac-
tion costs dwarf the monies spent on actual cleanup-transaction
costs were eighty-eight percent of all insurers' Superfund-related
expenditures through 1991, almost half of which was devoted to
disputing claims with policyholders.41 For insurers, this level of
transaction costs is more than twice as high as that experienced
for non-environmental CGL claims where insurers generally do
not dispute coverage and thereby make more indemnity pay-
ments."
Insurers have found it to be in their best interests to dispute
environmental claims' and therefore "[i]nsurers and insureds
are engaged in 'a fight for their financial lives,"' played out on
the battlefield of environmental coverage litigation.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL COVERAGE LITIGATION AND INTERPRETATION
OF THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
In disputing coverage for environmental claims, the three de-
fenses most commonly raised by insurers are: (1) remediation
costs incurred at the insistence of governmental regulators are
not "damages, ' " (2) the damages do not fall within the defini-
38. BEST REPORT, supra note 36, at 6 exhibit 3.
39. See LLOYD S. DIXON, FIXING SUPERFUND-THE EFFECT OF THE PROPOSED
SUPERFuND REFORM ACT OF 1994 ON TRANSACTION COSTS xvi-xvii (1994) [hereinafter
FIXING SUPERFUNDI.
40. FIXING SUPERFUND, supra note 39, at 5.
41. 1& at 41-43 & fig. 4.1.
42. JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION
COSTS-THE EXPERIENCE OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 30 (1992).
43. See LLOYD S. DIXON ET AL., PRIVATE-SECTOR CLEANUP EXPENDrruREs AND
TRANSACTION COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SITES 56 (1993) ("Many firms spend money on
coverage disputes with their insurers, but few receive reimbursement .... Overall,
insurers reimbursed PRfPs for approximately 8 percent of their expenditures.") [here-
inafter 18 SUPERFUND SITES].
44. Reiter et al., supra note 35, at 1172 (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d
1090 Vol. 34:1083
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tion of "occurrence" because they were expected or intended by
the insured," and (3) the pollution exclusion operates as a bar
to coverage. Of these three defenses, the one most increasingly
relied upon by insurers is the pollution exclusion."7
Insurance contracts are generally governed by state law, and
jurisdictions are split on the interpretation of the pollution exclu-
sion.' Therefore, "disagreement between insureds and insurers
concerning the meaning of [the pollution exclusion] has precipi-
tated 'a legal war ... in state and federal courts from Maine to
California.""9 The majority of the battles in the pollution exclu-
sion war involve the exception to the exclusion--"but this exclu-
sion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release, or escape
is sudden and accidental," and in particular the phrase "sudden
and accidental."' The primary interpretive disputes surround-
ing this exception are outlined below."1
707, 712-13 (8th Cir. 1992); New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
933 F.2d 1162, 1184-90 (3d Cir. 1991); Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 582-84 (Mass. 1990); Morton Intl, Inc. v. General Acci-
dent Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 843-47 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
In such disputes, insurers typically argue that "damages" connotes a legal remedy,
while an administrative order to clean up a site is an equitable action. See New
Castle County, 933 F.2d at 1185.
46. See, e.g., Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d
601, 605-06 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 865 (1992); New Castle County, 933
F.2d at 1191-92; Morton, 629 A-2d at 877-84. See supra note 30 and accompanying
text for the definition of "occurrence" in the standard CGL policy.
47. Increasing Reliance on Pollution Exclusion, ENVr'L LIAB. REP., Jan. 1,
1995, at 14 (Often, "little else stands between [insurers] and [indemnifying their
policyholders] in most of these cases.").
48. See FIXING SUPERFUND, supra note 39, at 41.
Consequently, in a dispute between an insurer and a policyholder where the
insurer has raised the pollution exclusion as a bar to coverage, the question of
choice-of-law is exceedingly important and may be determinative. See, e.g., General
Ceramics Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 647 (3d Cir. 1995) (choosing be-
tween the applicability of Pennsylvania's pro-insurer interpretation and New Jersey's
pro-policyholder interpretation); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc.,
659 A.2d 1295 (Md. 1995) (choosing between the applicability of Maryland's pro-in-
surer interpretation and Illinois's pro-policyholder interpretation).
49. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Aardvark Assoc., Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 191 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
50. See Stanley M. Spracker et al., A Trial Lawyer's Perspective on the Pollu-
tion Exclusion, 25 ENV'T L. REP. 10065, 10068 (1995) ("Seldom in the history of
contract law have three words generated so much controversy.").
51. In addition to disputes as to the interpretation of the exception, there is
also the question of upon whom the burden of proof rests to prove the applicability
of the exclusion-the insurer or the policyholder. Courts generally agree that the
burden of establishing a prima facie case of coverage-proving that there is an "oc-
currence" in an occurrence-based policy-is on the policyholder, and that the burden
shifts to the insurer to prove the applicability of any policy exception as an affirma-
tive defense. See, e.g., SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313
(Minn. 1995). However, courts are split as to the placement of the burden of proving
Duquesne Law Review
A. What Does "Sudden" Mean?
Environmental contamination commonly occurs through gradu-
al migration of contaminants through soil, groundwater, surface
water or sediments, often over a period of years or even decades.
Common scenarios include a landfill leaching pollutants, an un-
derground storage tank leaking petroleum, or an industrial facili-
ty which has become contaminated through multiple spills and
leaks from routine operations.
If the term "sudden" is interpreted as having a temporal ele-
ment, i.e., meaning abrupt or instantaneous, then environmental
damages arising out of the common scenarios described above
would not fall into the exception to the pollution exclusion and
therefore coverage under the standard CGL policy would be pre-
cluded. Alternatively, if "sudden" is interpreted without a tempo-
ral component-simply meaning "unexpected and unintend-
ed"--then coverage is not automatically precluded for gradual
polluting events.
1. Plain Meaning, Ambiguity and Dictionary Definitions
Insurers argue that one of the canons of insurance contract
construction is the plain meaning rule-that if unambiguous on
their face, words are to be given their plain, everyday and popu-
lar meaning-and that the plain meaning of "sudden" includes a
temporal element. 2
Policyholders, however, point to conflicting dictionary defini-
tions of the word "sudden" as evidence that there is more than
one reasonable interpretation of the clause, and it is therefore
ambiguous, so the plain meaning rule does not apply. 3 The defi-
the applicability of the exception to the pollution exclusion, most holding that once
the insurer has established that the exclusion applies, the burden of proving restora-
tion of coverage under the exception is on the policyholder. See, e.g., Employers Ins.
of Wausau v. Petroleum Specialties, Inc., 69 F.3d 98, 102 (6th Cir. 1995); Harrow
Prods., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1015, 1020 (6th Cir. 1995); SCSC
Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 314. But see Edo Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 366,
371 (D. Conn. 1995).
52. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1101
(Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993). See also Michael W. Peters, Note,
Insurance Coverage for Superfund Liability: A Plain Meaning Approach to the Pollu-
tion Exclusion Clause, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 161 (1987); GEORGE J. COUCH, 2 COUCH
ON INSURANCE 2d § 15:18, at 191 (1984) ("Indeed, if there is no ambiguity in the
insurance contract it is the duty of the court to apply to the words used their ordi-
nary meaning and not favor either party in the construction."). For further discus-
sion of the plain meaning rule, see infra Part IV.A.1.
53. See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga.
1092 Vol. 34:1083
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nitions of "sudden" in some standard dictionaries include a tem-
poral component such as "abruptness;" while others focus exclu-
sively on unexpectedness." Therefore, argue policyholders, be-
cause ambiguities in an insurance contract are to be construed
against the insurer, the interpretation in favor of coverage should
be adopted.5
2. Giving Effect to All Terms
Insurers also point to another uniformly recognized canon of
insurance policy construction-that all terms be given meaning
and effect.5 6 They note that "accidental" already connotes unex-
pectedness, and conclude that a definition of "sudden" without a
temporal component would render "accidental" redundant and
therefore superfluous.57
In response to the anti-redundancy argument, policyholders
1989).
54. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 688.
The primary definition of "sudden" in Webster's is "happening without previ-
ous notice or with very brief notice: coming or occurring unexpectedly: not foreseen
.or prepared for." WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY 2284 (1986). The tertiary defini-
tion of "sudden" in Webster's is "made, provided, brought about, or acting in a short
time: prompt, immediate . . . on the spur of the moment." Id.
The primary definition of "sudden" in Oxford's is "[o]f actions, events condi-
tions: Happening or coming without warning or premonition; taking place or appear-
ing all at once." 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY Su-Sz 96 (1933). The tertiary
definition of sudden in Oxford's is "[p]erformed or taking place without delay;
speedy; prompt, immediate." Id. at 97.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "sudden" as "[hiappening without previous
notice or with very brief notice; coming or occurring unexpectedly; unforseen; unpre-
pared for." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1432 (6th ed. 1990).
55. See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of the rule of contra insurer. See also
John S. Vishneski III et al., The Insurance Industry's 1970 Pollution Exclusion: An
Exercise in Ambiguity, 23 LOY. U. L.J. 67 (1991).
56. See COUCH, supra note 52, § 15:44, at 268-73 ("When reasonably possi-
ble, . . . operation, effect, and meaning should be given to each and every sentence,
clause, and word of a contract of insurance.").
57. See, e.g., Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160,
1164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co.,
999 F.2d 489, 493 (10th Cir. 1993); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics
Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1992); A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 1991); Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern
Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700, 704 (Fla. 1993) (citations omitted); Hybud Equip.
Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1101 (Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 507
U.S. 987 (1993).
However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals proffered that, without a tempo-
ral component, "sudden" would not be synonymous with "accidental" because acci-
dental means "unintended" and sudden means "unexpected." New Castle County v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,.933 F.2d 1162, 1194 (3d Cir. 1991) ("To the extent
that the meanings of these words overlap, we do not think that this preclude[s a
court] from defining sudden as unexpected.").
Duquesne Law Review
point out that redundancies are common in insurance policy
legalese and point to strings of terms in the pollution exclusion
itself such as "smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic
chemicals, liquids or gases" and "discharge, dispersal, release or
escape." 8 However, insurers respond that the anti-redundancy
cannon has more importance when the terms are used in the
conjunctive, (with the conjunction "and" as in the phrase "sudden
and accidental") than when the terms are used in the disjunctive
(with the conjunction "or"). 9 Furthermore, insurers argue that
terms such as "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" have
different shades of meaning, each of which may add a critical
element of application to the phrase."
There is also a pro-coverage argument which relies on the
canon of giving effect to all terms: reconciling "sudden and acci-
dental" with the definition of "occurrence." The standard CGL
policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous
or repeated exposure to conditions, which results in bodily injury
or property damage neither expected or intended from the stand-
point of the insured."6 ' Therefore, "accident" includes "continu-
ous or repeated exposure to conditions." If "sudden" were inter-
preted to mean "instantaneous," insureds argue, then the phrase
"sudden and accidental" would be inherently contradicto-
ry-instantaneous and continuous or repeated.62
3. Previous Judical Construction
Policyholders also argue that, prior to the introduction of the
pollution exclusion, the phrase "sudden and accidental" had been
used for many years in boiler and machinery policies, and had
been interpreted by courts to simply mean "unexpected and unin-
tended," with no temporal element.' Another of the canons of
insurance policy interpretation holds that "[tihe judical construc-
tion placed upon particular words or phrases made prior to the
issuance of a policy employing them will be presumed to have
58. See Charter Oil, 69 F.3d at 1164; Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1220 (IlM. 1992).
59. Charter Oil, 69 F.3d at 1164.
60. Id.
61. 1973 CGL Policy, supra note 27, at VI-20.
62. See Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092
(Colo. 1991); Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1219.
63. See Morton Intl, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 863-65
(N.J. 1993) (citing New England Gas & Elec. Ass'n v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee
Corp., 116 N.E.2d 671 (Mass. 1953), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994). See also




been the construction intended to be adopted by the parties."
Therefore, policyholders argue, the phrase "sudden and acciden-
tal" in the pollution exclusion clause should be afforded the same
pre-1970 construction applied by courts when interpreting boiler
and machinery policies."5
The case most commonly cited for the proposition that "sudden
and accidental" was judicially construed in boiler and machinery
policies prior to 1970 to mean "unexpected and unintended" and
to include damages that develop gradually is New England Gas
& Electric Ass'n v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp." In New
England Gas, the insured owned a turbine generator that was
covered by a boiler and machinery policy which covered loss re-
sulting from an accident.67 The policy defined "accident" as "a
sudden and accidental breaking, deforming, burning out or rup-
turing" of the machinery." The insured lost the use of a turbine
due to a crack in the spindle which, during an inspection after
the unit was taken out of service, was found to have formed over
a period of 2.4 to 10 hours.6 9 The court found for the insured,
rejecting the notion that "sudden," as used in the policy, connoted
"any idea of rapidity or quickness.""0 The court stated:
[We] give to the term sudden its primary meaning according to lexicogra-
phers as happening without previous notice or with very brief notice, or
as something coming or occurring unexpectedly, unforseen, or unpre-
pared for .... The damage to the spindle could not be reasonably antici-
64. Morton, 629 A.2d at 863 (quoting COUCH, supra note 52, § 15:20, at 195-
96).
65- See Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, The Stan-
dard-Form Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collec-
tive Amnesia, 21 ENVrL. L. 357, 379-82. (1991).
66. 116 N.E.2d 671, 680-81 (Mass. 1953). See also Julius Hyman & Co. v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 830, 832-33 (D. Colo. 1955); City of De-
troit Lakes v. Travelers Indem. Co., 275 N.W. 371, 372 (Minn. 1937); Anderson &
Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 333 P.2d 938, 940-41
(Wash. 1959). But see Cornell Wood Prods. Co. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
& Ins. Co., 62 F. Supp. 303, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1945).
After 1970, courts continued to interpret "sudden and accidental" in boiler
and machinery policies to include equipment failures that develop gradually. See
Community Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co.,
580 F. Supp. 1170, 1173 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 352 F.
Supp. 931, 934 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
See also GEORGE J. COUCH, 10A COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 42:396, at 505
(1982) ("When coverage is limited to a sudden 'breaking' of machinery the word 'sud-
den' should be given its primary meaning as happening without previous notice, or
as something coming or occurring unexpectedly, as unforseen and unprepared for.
That is, 'sudden' is not to be construed as synonymous with instantaneous.").
67. New England Gas, 116 N.E.2d at 675.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 678.
70. Id. at 680.
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pated, and its occurrence was unexpected and unforseen and consequent-
ly sudden in the ordinary meaning of the word.7
Similarly, in Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co.,72 a band saw covered by a
boiler and machinery policy was shut down due to a broken
wheel that, according to expert testimony, had gradually devel-
oped a crack over a period of one day to three weeks.73 The court
reviewed conflicting dictionary definitions-one affording "sud-
den" a temporal component and one focusing only on the "unex-
pectedness" of "sudden."74 The court noted that the purpose of
the policy language was to afford the insured protection for
equipment breakdown which was unavoidable-but to preclude
coverage if the insured behaved recklessly.' However, the court
concluded, this purpose would not be promoted by interpreting
"sudden" as "instantaneous," thereby precluding coverage for un-
detectable defects which developed gradually and could not have
been avoided by the insured. 6 In finding for the insured, the
court proffered that the purpose of the policy would be promoted
by interpreting sudden as "unforseen and unexpected."77
4. Split of Judicial Authority
The highest courts of fifteen states have had the occasion to
decide if "sudden," in the pollution exclusion clause, carries a
temporal element, and the courts are almost evenly split. The
71. Id. at 680-81.
72. 333 P.2d 938 (Wash. 1959).
73. Anderson & Middleton Lumber, 333 P.2d at 940.
74. Id.





highest courts of Oklahoma," Minnesota,7" Maryland,"0
Massachusetts,8 ' Michigan," Florida," Ohio,s and North
Carolina 8 have afforded "sudden" a temporal element. The
highest courts of Washington," South Carolina, 7 Illinois,"
West Virginia, 9 Colorado,"° Wisconsin,9 and Georgia92 have
held that "sudden" has no temporal element and simply means
78. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 760, 763-64 (Okla.
1995).
79. See Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888, 892
(Minn. 1994).
80. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 659 A.2d 1295,
1308 (Md. 1995).
81. See Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d
568, 572 (Mass. 1990).
82. See Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d 392, 394 (Mich.
1991).
83. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d
700, 704 (Fla. 1993) (four-to-three decision with vigorous dissent). Dimmitt involved
an insured that sold used crankcase oil to a recycler and subsequently became liable
under CERCLA for the cleanup of petroleum contamination at the recycler's facility.
Dimmitt, 636 So. 2d at 701. Demonstrative of the sharp split of opinion on this
issue is the fact the Supreme Court of Florida, also in a four-to-three decision, had
only ten months earlier filed an opinion in Dimmitt in which the court reached the
opposite result. See Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co., 35
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1700 (Fla. 1992), withdrawn and substituted by 636 So. 2d
700 (Fla. 1993). The swing vote was Justice Grimes, who, in a concurring opinion
that reads more like a coerced confession, states:
I originally concurred with the position of the dissenters in this case. I have
now become convinced that I relied too much on what was said to be the
drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause and perhaps subconsciously
upon the social premise that I would rather have insurance companies cover
these losses rather than parties such as Dimmitt who did not actually cause
the pollution damage. In doing so, I departed from the basic rule of interpre-
tation that language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Try as I
will, I cannot wrench the words "sudden and accidental" to mean "gradual and
accidental," which must be done in order to provide coverage in this case.
Dimmitt, 636 So. 2d at 706 (Grimes, J., concurring).
84. See Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102
(Ohio 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993).
85. See Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d
374, 382 (N.C. 1986).
86. See Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d
703, 720-25 (Wash. 1994).
87. See Greenville County v. Insurance Reserve Fund, 443 S.E.2d 552, 553
(S.C. 1994).
88. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204,
1220 (Ill. 1992).
89. See Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 500
(W. Va. 1992).
90. See Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1092
(Colo. 1991).
91. See Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Wis. 1990).
92. See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga.
1989).
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"unexpected and unintended." Most federal courts of appeal sit-
ting in diversity have found "sudden" to have a temporal ele-
ment."
B. What is the Relationship Between the Pollution Exclusion and
the Definition of "Occurrence?"
Courts have also addressed the relationship between the occur-
rence definition and the pollution exclusion. This is a particularly
relevant question for courts which conclude that "sudden" has no
temporal component, and therefore that "sudden and accidental"
means "unexpected and unintended"-the operative language in
the occurrence definition.94 In the pollution exclusion, is it the
discharge which must be unexpected and unintended, or the re-
sultant environmental damage? If it is the damage, as in the
occurrence definition, then the pollution exclusion and the occur-
rence definition are simply co-extensive-any damage, pollution-
related or otherwise, which is expected or intended is already
excluded from coverage by the standard CGL policy occurrence
definition.
Most courts which have considered the question have con-
cluded that the focus of the exception--'but this exclusion does
not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release, or escape is sudden
and accidental"-is on the discharge, not the damage." Such
93. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d 370, 372-73
(6th Cir. 1995) (construing Kentucky law); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Mo-
tor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 153 (7th Cir. 1994) (construing Indiana law); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 999 F.2d 489, 493 (10th Cir.
1993) (construing Kansas law); Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1437-3"8
(9th Cir. 1993) (construing Arizona and California law); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.
v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1992) (construing Missouri
law); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484,
1492 (10th Cir.) (construing Utah law), cert. denied sub nom. El Paso Natural Gas
Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 506 U.S. 955 (1992); Northern Ins. Co. of
N.Y. v. Aardvark Assoc., Inc., 942 F.2d 189, 193 (3d Cir. 1991) (construing
Pennsylvania law); A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66, 72
(1st Cir. 1991) (construing Maine law); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star
Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) (construing Kentucky law). But see
New Castle County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1193-99 (3d
Cir. 1991) (construing Delaware law).
94. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for the definition of "occurrence"
in the standard CGL policy.
95. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem., 962 F.2d at 1490-92; New Castle
County, 933 F.2d at 1199-1202; Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 760,
764 (Okla. 1995); Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882
P.2d 703, 724-25 (Wash. 1994). But see Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 499-500 (W. Va. 1992) (limiting the effect of the pollution exclu-
sion to a mere clarification of the definition of "occurrence" based on representations
made by the insurance industry to regulators concurrent with the introduction of the
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courts conclude that this interpretation is supported by the lan-
guage of the exception, and by a desire to afford the pollution
exclusion independent operative effect apart from the occurrence
definition.
C. What is the Relevant "Discharge, Dispersal, Release or
Escape?"
Courts which conclude that the occurrence definition and the
pollution exclusion are not co-extensive generally agree that the
focus of the occurrence definition is on the damages and the focus
of the pollution exclusion is on the discharge. However, these
courts remain in disagreement as to the relevant "discharge,
dispersal, release or escape" for purposes of the applicability of
the "sudden and accidental" analysis.
This fact-intensive question most commonly arises in the sce-
nario where a policyholder intentionally discharged waste into a
landfill, but assumed that the landfill was properly designed and
would not pollute the environment. Insurers urge that the rele-
vant "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" is the disposal of
waste into the landfill-a discharge which was clearly intended
and therefore not within the scope of the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the pollution exclusion. Policyholders, however, ar-
gue that the relevant "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" is
the one which was the proximate cause of the damage-the re-
lease of contaminants from the landfill, such release being unin-
tended and unexpected.96 As with the definition of "sudden,"
courts are split on this interpretative issue as well. 7
clause). See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of such repre-
sentations.
96. For the landfill scenario, this question generally only has relevance in
jurisdictions which have concluded that "sudden" has no temporal component of
abruptness. Otherwise, the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclu-
sion clause would apply to neither discharge: The disposal of waste into the landfill
is not accidental, and the migration of contamination from the landfill is generally
not abrupt, but gradual.
97. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26
F.3d 1195, 1204-05 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting the policyholder's position as "merely an
attempt to recast the damages ... as a separate discharge."); Patz v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that, where the
insured buried barrels of paint sludge, the relevant release was not the dumping of
the barrels, but the subsequent leaking of sludge from the barrels after they were
buried); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 606-08
(10th Cir.) (holding that the relevant discharge was the disposal of waste into con-
tainment ponds as opposed to the release of contamination from the containment
pond), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 865 (1992); Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins.
Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d 703, 718-19 (Wash. 1994) (holding that the relevant release
is discharge of pollutants from the landfill).
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In those jurisdictions which recognize a temporal component to
"sudden," a different interpretative dispute arises as to the rele-
vant discharge for purposes of the "sudden and accidental" excep-
tion. In such cases, policyholders have sought to avoid the harsh-
ness of the temporal interpretation by arguing that although the
damage occurred gradually over many years, each individual
"discharge, dispersal, release or escape" happened abruptly, and
therefore the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion is applicable and operates to restore coverage for the
damages arising out of each of these individual discharges.98
The majority of courts which have considered the issue have
refused to apply such a spill-by-spill analysis, reasoning that a
specific point in time when an individual discharge occurred can
almost always be identified, so that such an interpretation would
render the temporal component of "sudden" completely ineffec-
tive.9"
D. Unexpected and Unintended From Whose Point of View?
Whether or not a jurisdiction affords "sudden" a temporal com-
ponent meaning "abrupt," in order for coverage to be available
under the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion clause, the discharge must at least be "unexpected and
unintended." The question remains, unexpected and unintended
from whose point of view? The insured? The insured's predeces-
sor in interest? The insured's third party waste contractor?
In the scenarios in which the insured's predecessor in interest
intentionally polluted, or in which the insured had entrusted
waste to a third party contractor, the answer to this question
may be determinative. Insurers argue that the discharge must be
98. Such an argument is completely reasonable, especially in light of the dis-
tinction made between the focus of the occurrence definition (on the damages-which
usually result from cumulative effects over a period of many years) and the focus of
the pollution exclusion (on the discharge-which is more likely to happen abruptly).
99. See Quaker State Minit-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 52 F.3d
1522, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995); Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 F.3d
1175, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[Uinder that theory all releases would be sudden,
and the 'sudden and accidental' exception essentially would swallow the 'rule' of the
pollution exclusion.') (citations omitted); Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
974 F.2d 754, 766-69 (6th Cir. 1992) ('[Uinder this theory, all releases would be
sudden; one can always isolate a specific moment at which pollution actually enters
the environment."); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 659 A.2d
1295, 1308-09 (Md. 1995); Nashua Corp. v. First State Ins. Co., 648 N.E.2d 1272,
1275 (Mass. 1995). Perhaps these observations are simply another reason why no
temporal component should be read into the word "sudden" in the pollution exclu-
sion-because reasonable interpretations of the applicability of the term render the
temporal component ineffective.
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unexpected and unintended from the standpoint of the predeces-
sor in interest or the third party whose actions are more closely
associated with the discharge. Policyholders argue that the dis-
charge must be unexpected or unintended from the standpoint of
the insured, advocating consistency between the pollution exclu-
sion and the definition of occurrence. Once again, as with most
other disputes surrounding the pollution exclusion, courts are
split as to the correct interpretation.'O°
III. DRAFTING AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF THE STANDARD
CGL POLICY AND THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION
General liability insurance was first widely issued in the late
nineteenth century, with each insurer using its own policy
language.'0 ' In the 1930's, the insurance industry began draft-
ing standard policy language, a process which culminated in 1941
with the introduction of the first standard CGL policy.0 2 The
process of drafting standard policy language, which continues to
this day, is coordinated through an industry service organization
to which individual insurance companies subscribe.' 3 The orga-
nization which performs this function today is called the Insur-
ance Services Office, Inc. (the "ISO")."°' The predecessor organi-
zations to the ISO were the Insurance Rating Board (the "IRB")
and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (the "MIRB")."'0
Use of standard policy language affords several advantages to
insurers including elimination of costs of negotiating with indi-
vidual policyholders, predictability and consistency in judicial
interpretations, and facilitation of reinsurance and claims adjust-
ing."° This cooperation among insurers for standard policy lan-
100. See, e.g., Warwick Dyeing, 26 F.3d at 1202 n.3 (noting the split of authori-
ty and assuming without deciding that the relevant point of view is that of the in-
sured); Morton Intl, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 875 (N.J. 1993)
(holding that the pollution exclusion precludes coverage only for discharges expected
or intended by the insured), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994); Powers Chemco,
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the pollu-
tion exclusion precludes coverage for intentional conduct of insured's predecessor in
interest).
101. See Reiter et al., supra note 35, at 1178 n.55.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. CARTER & MEYER, supra note 25, § 3.1, at 27. The ISO describes itself as
"a nonprofit corporation that provides information about the property/casualty insur-
ance business, including statistical and actuarial information. ISO also provides ad-
visory policy forms and a variety of related services." ISO REPORT, supra note 19, at
ii.
105. CARTER & MEYER, supra note 25, § 3.1, at 27.
106. Id. (citing David B. Goodwin, Review Essay, Disputing Insurance Coverage
Disputes, 43 STAN. L. REV. 779, 782-83 (1991)).
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guage is possible because the insurance industry, since 1948, has
enjoyed a congressional exemption from most federal antitrust
prohibitions."7
The first standard form CGL policy was introduced in the
United States in 1941 and covered damages caused by an "acci-
dent."' Although undefined in the policy, "accident," a term
adopted from automobile liability policies, was generally thought
of as a "boom" event where the cause and effect (damages) hap-
pened simultaneously. 9 By the 1960's, the nature of business
liabilities had begun to change, spurred on by developing tort law
in areas such as products liability, where there is often a latency
period between the conduct and damages resulting therefrom."0
In order to accommodate these new species of liabilities, courts
began to interpret "accident" more expansively to encompass
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, thereby increasing
insurer exposure for such claims."'
In response to this changing nature of business liabilities,
insureds began to demand broader coverage options and insurers
such as Lloyd's of London responded." Faced with internation-
al competition and adverse judicial decisions, the insurance in-
dustry responded with the introduction of a new occurrence-
based CGL policy in 1966."
The insurance industry continually represented the change as
a major expansion of coverage, noting particularly that the re-
vised policy covered gradual polluting events. In seeking approval
for the policy language from state regulatory authorities, the
MIRB explained:
Coverage has been broadened to an "occurrence" basis which is defined in
the jacket. The definition reinforces the intent that the injury be fortu-
itous from the insured's standpoint and by the addition of coverage for
"injurious exposure to conditions" eliminates the connotation of sudden-
ness previously intended as respects coverage on an "accident" basis."'
107. See McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(b), 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994)).
108. Spracker et al., supra note 50, at 10067.
109. Id. A typical accident-based policy of that era would have provided: "(Tihe
insurer agrees with the insured . . . to pay, on behalf of the insured, all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of...
injury to or destruction of property, including loss of use thereof, caused by acci-
dent." Reiter et al., supra note 35, at 1187 n.92 (first and third alterations in origi-
nal) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).




114. Morton Intl, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 852 (N.J.
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At the time of the adoption of the occurrence-based CGL form,
a memorandum entitled Summary of Broadened Coverage Under
New GL Policies With Necessary Limitations to Make This Broad-
ening Possible was circulated internally at Liberty Mutual Insur-
ance Company." The memorandum indicated that the new
CGL policy provided coverage for "gradual [damage] resulting
over a period of time from exposure to the insured's waste dis-
posal. Examples would be gradual adverse effect of smoke, fumes,
air or stream pollution, contamination of water supply or vegeta-
tion."'
16
In 1965, an insurance industry representative, in commenting
on the new occurrence-based CGL policy stated that "[i]t is in the
waste disposal area that a manufacturer's basic premises-opera-
tion coverage is liberalized most substantially.""7
In May of 1970, just four years after the change to the occur-
rence-based standard CGL policy, the IRB introduced the new
pollution exclusion as a mandatory endorsement to the standard
CGL policy."' By that time, most states had promulgated stat-
utes which required that proposals for new policy language be
filed with and approved by the state insurance commissioner
prior to inclusion of that language in policies issued to insureds
of the state.""
Policyholders have often pointed to representations made by
the insurance industry during this regulatory approval process as
evidence that the pollution exclusion was not intended to be, or
at least not represented to be, a significant reduction in pollution
coverage from the 1966 occurrence-based CGL policy.12 In ef-
forts to gain approval for the pollution exclusion, the MIRB sub-
1993) (quoting MIRB, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM OF CHANGES SUBMITTED TO THE
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF BANKING & INSURANCE (1966)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2764 (1994).
115. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 498 (W.
Va. 1992).
116. Joy Technologies, 421 S.E.2d at 49&
117. George Pendygraft et al., Who Pays for Environmental Damage: Recent
Developments in CERCLA Liability and Insurance Coverage Litigation, 21 INDIANA L.
REV. 117, 141-42 & n.106 (1988) (quoting G.L. Bean, Assistant Secretary, Liberty
Mut. Insurance Company, New Comprehensive Guaranty and Automobile Program,
The Effects on Manufacturing Risks, paper presented at Mutual Insurance Technical
Conference 6 (1965)).
118. Soderstrom, supra note 31, at 766 & n.19.
119. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 70A.06, subd. 2 (West 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:29AA-6 (West 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.03(A) (Anderson 1989); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 477(b) (1992).
120. See Salisbury, supra note 65.
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mitted a now infamous explanatory memorandum to state insur-
ance commissioners, which read:
Coverage for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases
under present policies because the damages can be said to be expected or
intended and thus are excluded by the definition of occurrence. The
above exclusion clarifies this situation so as to avoid any questions of in-
tent. Coverage is continued for pollution or contamination caused injuries
when the pollution or contamination results from an accident.2'
The same explanation was submitted to the appropriate regu-
latory authorities of most states.'22
The first sentence of the explanation is quite curious: "Cover-
age for pollution or contamination is not provided in most cases
under present policies because the damages can be said to be
expected or intended and thus are excluded by the definition of
occurrence." The then-present policy was the occurrence-based
policy introduced in 1966 which was represented by the insur-
ance industry at the time as a major expansion of coverage, par-
ticularly in the area of pollution.'23
The second sentence of the explanation, "[the pollution] exclu-
sion clarifies this situation," clearly implies that the pollution ex-
clusion represented no change in coverage-simply a clarification
of the then-current coverage afforded under the definition of oc-
currence.
The third sentence of the explanation provides that "[c]overage
is continued for pollution or contamination caused injuries when
the pollution or contamination results from an accident." This
suggests that the then-current coverage for pollution damages
continues, qualified only by the requirement that the damage
121. Sheldon Hurwitz & Dan D. Kohane, The Love Canal-Insurance Coverage
for Environmental Accidents, 50 INS. COUNS. J. 378, 379 (1983).
122. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Botkin Grain Co., 64 F.3d 537, 541 (10th
Cir. 1995) (Kansas Insurance Commissioner); New Castle County v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1198 (3d Cir. 1991) (Pennsylvania Commissioner
of Insurance); Dimmitt Chevrolet v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700,
714 (Fla. 1993) (Overton, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing) (Florida De-
partment of Insurance); Anderson v. Minnesota Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 534 N.W.2d 706,
708 (Minn. 1995) (Minnesota Insurance Commissioner); Morton Intl, Inc. v. General
Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 851 (N.J. 1993) (New Jersey Department of Insur-
ance), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994); Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 499 (W. Va. 1992) (West Virginia Insurance Commissioner);
Reiter et al., supra note 35, at 1200-02 (Ohio Department of Insurance). See also
Letter from R. Stanley Smith, Manager, IRB, to Mr. Emory Lipscomb, Rating De-
puty, Georgia Insurance Department, June 10, 1979, reproduced in Claussen v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1583 app. B (S.D. Ga. 1987), rev'd,
888 F.2d 747 (l1th Cir. 1989).
123. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1966
revision to the CGL policy.
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result from an accident. However, the word "accident" was al-
ready part of the definition of "occurrence," so it may seem that
no additional showing need be made by policyholders beyond
proving an "occurrence" in order to make out a valid claim for
coverage of pollution damages under the standard CGL policy.
As further evidence that the insurance industry intended the
pollution exclusion as merely a clarification of the occurrence
definition, an underwriter's handbook described the purpose of
the clause as follows:
In one important respect, the exclusion simply reinforces the definition of
occurrence. That is, the policy states that it will not cover claims where
the "damage was expected or intended" by the insured and the exclusion
states, in effect, that the policy will cover incidents which are sudden and
accidental-unexpected and not intended."
Clearly, the official explanation of the insurance industry in
support of the pollution exclusion would lead a reasonable regula-
tor, and indeed a reasonable policyholder, to conclude that no
substantial reduction in coverage was intended. There is evidence
in the response of the regulators that they did indeed so con-
clude.
After considering insurance industry explanations as to the
scope of the pollution exclusion, in approving the clause, the
Kansas Insurance Commissioner replied that "although we are in
agreement that pollution and contamination need some type of
outlines established, it should be recognized by the [insurance]
industry that there can be purely accidental pollution and there
should be coverage provided for the insured that is not at
fault."2
Similarly, the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner, in reli-
ance upon insurance industry representations as to the scope of
the pollution exclusion, gave his approval of the clause with an
order that stated:
(1) The said companies and rating organizations have represented to
the Insurance Commissioners, orally and in writing, that the proposed
exclusions.., are merely clarifications of existing coverage as defined
and limited in the definitions of the term "occurrence," contained in the
respective policies to which said exclusions would be attached;
(2) To the extent that said exclusions are mere clarifications of exist-
ing coverage, the Insurance Commissioner finds that there is no objection
to the approval of such exclusions."e
124. Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 121, at 379 (citations omitted).
125. Botkin Grain, 64 F.3d at 541 (alteration in original).
126. Joy Technologies, 421 S.E.2d at 499 (alteration in original).
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Further, in submitting the pollution exclusion clause to state
regulators for approval, the insurance industry did not apply for
any corresponding premium reduction for what it now represents
to have been a significant curtailment in coverage."
After the clause was approved by the respective state insur-
ance commissioners, it was universally included by insurers in
CGL policies issued to governmental and business insureds for
the next decade and a half until it was replaced by the absolute
pollution exclusion in 1986.12
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR INTERPRETATION IN FAVOR OF COVERAGE
Over the last several years, and especially in 1995, insurers
have increasingly garnered favorable court rulings on the inter-
pretation of the pollution exclusion in jurisdictions throughout
the country.'2 9 This comment is in response to that trend, in an
effort to develop arguments which may be used to influence juris-
dictions which have yet to decide the issue. This Part reviews the
classic legal theories supporting a pro-coverage interpretation of
the pollution exclusion-contra insurer, estoppel and public poli-
cy-yet does so in light of modern movements in contract law as
well as recent developments in the insurance industry.
A. The Contra Insurer and Reasonable Expectations Doctrines
There are two well established and closely related rules of
insurance policy construction, both of which point to interpreta-
tion in favor of coverage. They are the contra insurer doctrine
and the reasonable expectations doctrine. Contra insurer is es-
sentially a corollary of the contra proferentum rule. The rule
holds that any ambiguities in an insurance policy are to be re-
127. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 872-73 (N.J.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
128. Morton, 629 A.2d at 831. The pollution exclusion was approved in almost
every state-New Hampshire being one of the rare exceptions. Reiter et al., supra
note 35, at 1168 & n.18.
129. Indeed, the A.M. Best Company, in observation of "favorable emerging case
law," has lowered its "insurers' liability factor," which is an estimate of the propor-
tion of PRP liability that will be borne by insurers, from 50% to 40%. BEST REPORT,
supra note 36, at 9.
The insurance industry has been accused of manipulating the development of
important judicial precedent, especially in environmental claims cases. See Roger
Parloff, Rigging the Common Law, AM. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 74 (cataloging reports of
insurers making settlement offers in exchange for agreements to forgo appeal of pro-
insurer decisions or to join in a petition for vacature or depublication of pro-policy-
holder decisions). Perhaps this tactic is a factor in the recent development of "favor-
able emerging case law."
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solved against the drafter of the policy-the insurer 30 The con-
tra insurer rule is the law in at least forty-six states,'31 and is
especially applicable to exclusionary clauses.1
3
1
The second rule is the reasonable expectations doctrine, which
holds that an insurance policy should be interpreted in accor-
dance with the reasonable expectations of the insured."= The
reasonable expectations doctrine applies irrespective of whether
the language in the policy is ambiguous or unambiguous-it
simply asks: "Would a reasonable insured in this position expect
coverage?" 4 The court may look to extrinsic evidence to deter-
mine if the reasonable expectations of the insured were influ-
enced by misleading statements on the part of the insurer.' At
least thirty-eight states recognize the reasonable expectations
doctrine."'6
There are several important justifications for these pro-policy-
holder interpretation canons. The first is that insurance policies
are essentially adhesion contracts-the nonnegotiable policy
language is drafted by the insurer and the insured is in no posi-
tion to bargain.'37 Secondly, these canons give insurers an in-
centive to draft clear and unmistakable policy language, which,
in turn, serves to reduce claim litigation.'38 Finally, because
these canons turn policy language interpretation into a question
of law, coverage litigation can more often be resolved at the sum-
mary judgement stage, avoiding time-consuming and expensive
discovery into the facts surrounding the intent of the parties.3 9
130. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204,
1217 (Ill. 1992); JOHN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, 13 INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 7401, at 197 (1976) ("It has been almost the unanimous holding of all
courts that insurance contracts must be liberally construed in favor of a policyhold-
er . . . wherever possible, and strictly construed against the insurer in order to af-
ford the protection which the insured was endeavoring to secure when he applied for
the insurance.").
131. See ZULKEY, supra note 25, § 3.05, at 3-5. For a list of these states and
contra insurer case law, see id. at app. 3A.
132. New York v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 789 (2d Cir. 1994) (lA]n insurer must
establish that the exclusion is stated in clear and unmistakable language [and] is
subject to no other reasonable interpretation . . . ") (quoting Continental Casualty
Co. v. Rapid-American Corp., 609 N.E.2d 506, 512 (N.Y. 1993)); Outboard Marine,
607 N.E.2d at 1217.
133. See ZULKEY, supra note 25, § 3.06, at 3-6.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 3.09, at 3-11.
136. Id. § 3.08, at 3-10. For a list of these states and the relevant case law,
see id. at app. 3B.
137. Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1217; Goodwin, supra note 106, at 787;
COUCH, supra note 52, § 15:78, at 382-87.
138. Goodwin, supra note 106, at 787.
139. Id. at 787-88. It is not inequitable that this question of law would most
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It would seem that, using these pro-insured rules of policy
interpretation, courts would uniformly interpret the pollution
exclusion in favor of coverage. However, there are two arguments
commonly raised by insurers in an effort to preclude applicability
of these doctrines to pollution exclusion disputes-the plain
meaning rule and the sophisticated insured doctrine. As dis-
cussed below, in light of modern movements in contract law and
recent developments in the insurance industry, these arguments
must fail.
1. The Fallacy of the Plain Meaning Rule
The conditions precedent for application of the contra insurer
doctrine and the reasonable expectations doctrine, are, respec-
tively, that the policy language be ambiguous and that the expec-
tation of the insured is reasonable. However, much of the evi-
dence which demonstrates the existence of these conditions is
extrinsic to the policy, e.g., conflicting dictionary definitions, "
drafting and regulatory history,14" ' pre-existing judicial construc-
tion"" and conflicting judicial decisions." Unfortunately,
some courts have simply refused to consider the extrinsic evi-
dence, rigidly applying the plain meaning rule, and holding that
if the words in the policy are "unambiguous" on their face, the
court is simply unable to entertain extrinsic evidence, regardless
of its probative value or persuasiveness."
often allow summary judgement to be granted in favor of the insured. When a siz-
able claim is the subject of litigation, an insurer often has no incentive to settle and
every incentive to prolong the litigation. This is so because during the pendency of
the litigation, the insurer may make more money through investment return on the
withheld claim then it spends in disputing it. Id. at 787-88 & n.46.
140. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part III.
142. See supra Part II.A.3.
143. See supra notes 53-100 and accompanying text. The existence of conflict-
ing judicial decisions is generally accepted as strong evidence of ambiguity. See
COUCH, supra note 52, § 15:84, at 419 ("The fact that courts of the several juris-
dictions have arrived at different constructions as to the meaning of the words in a
provision or exclusion of a policy, and even in some instances have taken almost
opposite views, is some indication that the terms are ambiguous."). See also Just v.
Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 578 (Wis. 1990). The Just court stated:
[T]he fact that substantial conflicting authority exists with respect to the "cor-
rect" interpretation of the exclusionary terms merely serves to strengthen the
conclusion that the terms are susceptible to more than one meaning, and thus
ambiguous .... [T]his type of comprehensive debate dispels the insurer's
contention that the exclusionary language is clear.
Just, 456 N.W.2d at 578 (citations omitted).
144. See, e.g., Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Botkin Grain Co., 64 F.3d 537, 541
(10th Cir. 1995); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Duro Bag Mfg. Co., 50 F.3d 370, 373 (6th
Cir. 1995); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 153
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An early statement of the plain meaning rule can be found in
an 1843 English case:
[W]here the words of any written instrument are free from ambiguity in
themselves .... such instrument is always to be construed according to
the strict, plain, common meaning of the words themselves;... [and]
evidence dehors the instrument for the purpose of explaining it according
to the surmised or alleged intention of the parties to the instrument is
utterly inadmissable.'"
However, the plain meaning rule has fallen out of favor with
modern courts and contract scholars.'
First of all, the rule presumes that the plain meaning of words
in a contract, and whether or not such words are ambiguous, can
be readily ascertained simply from an examination of the instru-
ment itself. In interpreting the pollution exclusion, the Supreme
Court of Ohio made that presumption when it stated that be-
cause the intent of the parties was evident from "clear and unam-
biguous" policy language, the court refused to "resort to construc-
tion of that language."47 On such logic, the eminent contract
scholar, Professor Corbin, has remarked:
It is sometimes said, in a case in which the written words seem plain and
clear and unambiguous, that the words are not subject to interpretation
or construction. One who makes this statement has of necessity already
given the words an interpretation-the one that is to him plain and
clear; and in making the statement he is asserting that any different
interpretation is "perverted" and untrue.'"
Indeed, Oliver W. Holmes has observed that "[a] word is not
crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living
thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used,"" 9 and Pro-
(7th Cir. 1994); Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So.
2d 700, 705 (Fla. 1993); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 555
N.E.2d 568, 573 (Mass. 1990); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 476 N.W.2d
392, 396 n.6 (Mich. 1991); Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 905 P.2d 760, 764
(Okla. 1995).
145. Margaret N. Kniflin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search
for Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REV. 643, 644 n.2 (1995) (quot-
ing Attorney-General v. Shore, 11 Sim. 592, 615-31 (1843), reprinted in 59 Eng. Rep.
1002, 1021 (1906)).
146. See generally Kniffin, supra note 145 (discussing the trend of rejection of
the plain meaning rule as unrealistic). Professor Kniffin is responsible for revisions
to the contract interpretation volume of Corbin on Contracts. Id. at 643 n.*.
147. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102
(Ohio 1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993).
148. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 86, at 406 (1990)
(quoting Authur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule,
50 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 171-72 (1965)).
149. MURRAY, supra note 148, § 86, at 407 (quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S.
11091996
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fessor Farnsworth, Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, wonders whether "a word has any meaning at all
when divorced from the circumstances in which it is used."15
Not only is the plain meaning rule based on an unrealistic
presumption which has been rejected by twentieth century con-
tract scholars, but that presumption is then used to preclude
consideration of the very evidence that may reveal its fallacy.
Modern contract scholars uniformly disfavor this mechanical and
ill-advised preclusion of extrinsic evidence.15" ' The more modern
view favors consideration of extrinsic evidence of the circum-
stances of the making of the contract as part of the interpretative
process, without any finding of "ambiguity" as a condition prece-
dent.15 This is the view adopted by the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods.1"
418, 425 (1918)).
150. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, II FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.10, at 256
(1990) (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, 'Meaning" in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J.
939, 940-42 (1967)).
151. See AUTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 542-542A, at 100-29
(1960 & Supp. 1994). A rigid application of the plain meaning rule "should be sub-
ject to constant attack and disapproval." Id. § 542, at 108-10. See also Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968)
(Traynor, C.J.). The court stated:
A rule that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written instru-
ment to its four-corners merely because it seems to the court to be clear and
unambiguous, would either deny the relevance of the intention of the parties
or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and stability our language has not
attained.
Pacific Gas & Elec., 442 P.2d at 644.
152. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 150, § 7.10, at 255-56 (citations omitted).
Farnsworth states:
The overarching principle of contract interpretation is that the court is free to
look to all the relevant circumstances surrounding the transaction. This in-
cludes all writings, oral statements, and other conduct by which the parties
manifested their assent, together with any prior negotiations between them
and any applicable course of dealing, course of performance, or usage....
[Tlhere should be no requirement that the language be ambiguous, vague, or
otherwise uncertain before the inquiry is undertaken.
Id.
See also Pacific Gas & Elec., 442 P.2d at 644 (holding that the standard for
admissibility of extrinsic evidence to interpret a contract was not whether language
appeared "clear and unambiguous" on its face, but whether such evidence is relevant
to prove a meaning to which the language is reasonably susceptible); MURRAY, supra
note 148, § 86, at 407 ("While the interpretation process should begin with the usu-
al and ordinary meaning of the words in a contract, courts should be willing to
admit evidence that would supersede the usual meaning, e.g., evidence of trade us-
age.") (citations omitted).
153. Kniffin, supra note 145, at 649-51 (citations omitted).
In fact, it seems that influential insurance law treatises may also be recog-
1110
In accord with this view, the Supreme Court of West Virginia
relied heavily on the extrinsic evidence of the drafting and regu-
latory history of the pollution exclusion clause, and concluded
that in light of such evidence the clause would be given effect
only to the extent that it clarifies the definition of "occur-
rence."'
54
2. The Fallacy of the Sophisticated Insured Argument
Insurers also argue that commercial policyholders should not
be given the benefit of contra insurer and reasonable expecta-
tions doctrines because they are "sophisticated" insureds that are
in no need of the judicial protection which may be afforded to
individual consumers.155 As appealing as this argument may
seem in theory, in fact, whether the insured is a residential
homeowner or a multinational manufacturer, the insured is pre-
sented with standard non-negotiable policy language on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis." 6 The use of the standard CGL policy across
the entire insurance industry effectively robs even "sophisticated"
insureds of any benefit which may be derived from competition
among insurers for more favorable language. In fact, even corpo-
rate policyholders rarely receive a copy of the policy until after
the premium is paid.'57 If a corporate insured has any bargain-
ing power at all, such power would normally be exercised in or-
der to increase coverage limits, not to dicker about policy lan-
guage.' 5' Indeed, the very purpose of the regulatory approval
nizing the more modern view in recent revisions. See APPLEMAN, supra note 130, §
7386, at 38 (Supp. 1995) ("In deciding whether an ambiguity in an insurance policy
exists, the court must not consider the policy in a vacuum but instead is required to
consider the particular factual setting in which the policy was issued.").
154. Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 499-500
(W. Va. 1992).
155. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993)
("Hughes is not an unsophisticated consumer.. . ."); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218 (1l. 1992) ("The insurers argue that [con-
tra insurer] should not apply here because [the insured] is a large corporation, so-
phisticated and counseled in insurance matters."). See also APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN,
supra note 130, § 7403, at 301 (The contra insurer doctrine "need not be strictly ad-
hered to in instances where one large corporation and one large insurance company
both advised by competent counsel do business with each other.").
156. Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1217-18 ("The insurance industry is pow-
erful and closely knit .... Any insured, whether large and sophisticated or not,
must enter into a contract with the insurer which is written according to the
insurer's pleasure by the insurer.").
157. Nancy Ballard & Peter Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the
Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610, 621
(1990).
158. Goodwin, supra note 106, at 797.
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process for standard policy language is so that the state can
negotiate with the insurance industry on behalf of policyholders
who never get that chance.' 5
The limited availability and high cost of pollution coverage in
today's insurance market aptly demonstrates the reality of the
superior bargaining power of the insurers, regardless of the char-
acter of the insured."' 0 A recent study by the United States
General Accounting Office (the "GAO") revealed that most haz-
ardous waste management facilities report great difficulty in ob-
taining pollution insurance, with nearly half of those who seek
pollution insurance being denied.'"' The study also showed that
today's pollution coverage business is dominated by one insur-
er-National Union Fire Insurance Company-which corners
77% of the market.'62 The median premium charged is $22 per
$1,000 of annual aggregate coverage," translating into an av-
erage annual premium of $22,000 to $176,000.16
Additional evidence of the non-competitive nature of the pollu-
tion coverage market is found in the recently settled massive
insurance antitrust litigation."a Suit was brought by twenty
state attorneys general against four U.S. insurers-Hartford,
Allstate, Aetna and CIGNA-two industry trade associations
including the ISO, and various foreign and domestic
reinsurers.' The defendants were charged with conspiracy in
violation of section one of the Sherman Act.' 7 The complaint al-
159. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 848 (N.J.
1993) ("The [insurance] industry's presentation and characterization of the standard
pollution-exclusion clause to state regulators constituted virtually the only opportu-
nity for arms-length bargaining by interests adverse to the industry, insureds having
virtually no choice at all but to purchase the industry-wide standard CGL policy."),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
160. Today, pollution coverage is generally provided under Environmental Im-
pairment Liability ("EIL") policies, purchased separately to supplement the coverage
provided by the standard CGL policy. See CARTER & MEYER, supra note 25, § 4.3, at
48-51.
161. GAO, HAZARDOUS WASTE-AN UPDATE ON THE COST AND AVAILABILITY OF
POLLUTION INSURANCE 23 (1994) [hereinafter COST AND AVAILABILITY OF POLLUTION
INSURANCE].
162. COST AND AvAILABILrry OF POLLUTION INSURANCE, supra note 161, at 20.
163. Id.
164. EPA regulations require that hazardous waste management facilities dem-
onstrate annual aggregate pollution coverage of $2 million to $8 million depending
upon the type of facility. COST AND AvAILABILrTY OF POLLUTION INSURANCE, supra
note 161, at 11 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 264.147 (1995)).
165. See Insurance Companies Settle Multistate Conspiracy Charges, 67 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 434, 434 (1994) [hereinafter Insurance Companies
Settle].
166. Insurance Companies Settle, supra note 165, at 434.
167. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2895 (1993) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1994)).
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leged that the defendants conspired, using the ISO and the Lon-
don reinsurance market, to pressure other domestic insurers to
change their CGL policies to conform to the policies being offered
by the defendants.' Among the changes that the defendants
allegedly conspired to enforce was the complete elimination from
the market of the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion in
favor of the absolute pollution exclusion.'69 Although the insur-
ance industry has been granted qualified immunity from federal
antitrust laws under section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act,17 the Supreme Court held that such immunity does not
extend to most of the conduct alleged in the complaint by the
attorneys general, and allowed the suit to proceed.'7 ' After the
adverse Supreme Court ruling, the industry settled with the
states.'72 In the settlement, which was reached in October of
1994, the defendants agreed to pay $36 million and to effectuate
major changes in the industry.'73
In light of these realities of the superior bargaining power of
the insurance industry in dictating standard policy language, the
justifications for the contra insurer and reasonable expectations
doctrines remain strongly applicable even in the case of the "so-
phisticated" insured.
B. Estoppel
Given the consistent representations by the insurance industry
that the pollution exclusion was merely a clarification of the
occurrence definition and the lack of any indication by the indus-
try that the exclusion was intended to effect a significant reduc-
tion in coverage, there are only two possible explanations for the
industry's behavior: the industry intentionally misled regulators
in 1970 or the industry did not intend, in 1970, that the pollution
168. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2895-97. Specifically, the complaints alleged
that the ISO agreed to stop providing vital actuarial and rating information support
services for standard policy forms that contained language disfavored by the defen-
dants, and that the foreign reinsurers agreed to refuse to reinsure policies written
on such forms. Id. at 2897-99.
169. Id. at 2897-99. The complaint also alleged that the defendants conspired to
pressure insurers to write exclusively claims-made CGL policies and eliminate occur-
rence-based CGL policies. Id. at 2896. Such a change would also effectively reduce
coverage for damages from polluting events due to the long latency period often
associated with such damages.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
171. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2895. The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not
provide the insurance industry with antitrust immunity for conduct involving
"boycott, coercion, or intimidation." Id. at 2900-01 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1994)).




exclusion effect a significant reduction in coverage.
Several courts and commentators which have examined the
drafting and regulatory history of the pollution exclusion have
concluded that there was intentional misrepresentation by the
insurance industry in 1970.174 However, let's explore the theory
that the industry did not intend, in 1970, that the pollution ex-
clusion effect a reduction in coverage, but adopted that position
post facto when the industry was faced with escalating environ-
mental liabilities after CERCLA.
Some courts which have considered but rejected this theory
have proffered that the pollution exclusion must have been in-
tended to effect some reduction in coverage-it would make no
sense for the insurance industry to introduce an exclusion that is
co-extensive with the definition of occurrence and therefore mere-
ly superfluous and ineffective language.'75 However, commenta-
tors who have analyzed the history leading to the introduction of
the pollution exclusion have offered an alternative motivation,
besides coverage reduction, for the insurance industry to introdu-
ce the pollution exclusion.
In the late 1960's, there was a recent upsurge in environmen-
tal awareness, spurred on by several high profile environmental
disasters including the sinking of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon
off the coast of England and an oil drilling accident off the coast
of Santa Barbara, California.' In 1970, the United States cele-
brated its first Earth Day, awakening the collective conscious of
the country to environmental issues.'77 Due to the pressures
precipitated by these events, the insurance industry wanted to
assure that it was viewed in the eyes of the public as being
"against polluters," and saw the pollution exclusion as a way to
effectuate this public relations goal.7 8 This theory of the
industry's motivation for the introduction of the pollution exclu-
174. See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1571, 1573 n.4
(S.D. Ga. 1987) ("he Court finds dishonesty in the representation made to the
Georgia Insurance Department in 1970 that the pollution exclusion clause would
have little effect on preexisting coverage."), rev'd on other grounds, 888 F.2d 747
(l1th Cir. 1989). See also infra note 189 and accompanying text for a finding of de-
ception by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
175. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d
1162, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1991).
176. See Reiter et al., supra note 35, at 1167, 1194-96.
177. Earth Day-Thousands Gather for Demonstrations, Some Ask How Long
Effect Will Last, 1 Env't Rep. (BNA) 13 (1970).
178. See Reiter et al., supra note 35, at 1168, 1195-96. See also New Castle
County, 933 F.2d at 1197 ("According to the [insured], the insurers appended this
exclusion onto their policies in order to reaffirm existing limits on pollution coverage,
thus distancing themselves in the public mind from deliberate polluters.").
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sion is more historically tenable than the theory that the insur-
ance industry did intend to restrict coverage for unexpected and
unintended pollution. In 1970, the insurance industry certainly
could not have foreseen the imposition ten years later of broad
liability for non-negligent pollution under CERCLA.'79
Irrespective of whether the insurance industry was guilty of
misrepresentation in 1970, or whether it merely did not intend,
in 1970, that the pollution exclusion effect a significant reduction
in coverage, the industry should now be estopped from claiming,
a quarter-century later, that the pollution exclusion is more re-
strictive than representations made to policyholders and state
regulators at the time of the introduction of the clause, because
such policyholders and regulators have relied on those represen-
tations to their detriment.
The use of the estoppel theory in interpreting the pollution
exclusion was introduced by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident Insurance Co."'°
In Morton, the plaintiffs ("Morton") predecessor in interest had
operated a mercury processing plant for over forty years, result-
ing in significant mercury contamination of the plant property
and a nearby creek.'' The New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection sued Morton and other defendants to compel
remediation of the contaminated site."2 Morton, in turn, sued
the insurer-defendants seeking reimbursement for the
remediation costs under several of the CGL policies held by Mor-
ton and its predecessors." The insurers raised, among other
defenses, the pollution exclusion as a bar to coverage."" The
court concluded that, if given a literal interpretation (including a
temporal component to "sudden"), the pollution exclusion would
operate as a "sharp[] and dramatic[]" restriction of coverage from
that previously afforded under the pre-1970 standard CGL poli-
cy. "' However, because the insurance industry represented that
the pollution exclusion was merely a "clarification" of the occur-
rence definition," the court refused to afford the insurance in-
dustry the benefit of its misrepresentations, but would interpret
179. See Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 689 D4 (Ga.
1989).
180. 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2764 (1994).
181. Morton, 629 A.2d at 834.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 834-35.
184. Id. at 847.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text for the insurance industry
representation of the pollution exclusion clause before state insurance regulators.
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the pollution exclusion in accordance with the "objectively reason-
able expectations" of the regulatory authorities who approved the
clause in 1970 in reliance on the industry assurances."7 The
court stated:
[We decline to enforce the standard pollution-exclusion clause as writ-
ten. To do so would contravene this State's public policy requiring regula-
tory approval of standard industry-wide policy forms to assure fairness in
rates and in policy content, and would condone the industry's misrepre-
sentations to regulators in New Jersey and other states concerning the
effect of the clause.'
To describe a reduction in coverage of that magnitude as a "clarification"
not only is misleading, but comes perilously close to deception. Moreover,
had the industry acknowledged the true scope of the proposed reduction
in coverage, regulators would have been obliged to consider imposing a
correlative reduction in rates.l"
Exercising its equitable powers, the court used the estoppel
theory, based on the reasonable reliance of state regulators and
insureds, to construct an interpretation of the pollution exclusion
consistent with the representations made by the insurance indus-
try in 1970.' The court summarized its estoppel doctrine this
way:
[W]here an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even though innocently,
the coverage of an insurance contract, or the exclusions therefrom, to an
insured before or at the inception of the contract, and the insured rea-
sonably relies thereupon to his ultimate detriment, the insurer is es-
topped to deny coverage after a loss on a risk or from a peril actually not
covered by the terms of the policy. The proposition is one of elementary
and simple justice. "'
As to the issue of reliance on the part of insureds, the court
proffered that, once approved by the regulators, the standard
187. Morton, 629 A.2d at 848.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 853.
190. Specifically, the court held that the pollution exclusion would operate to
"provide coverage identical with that provided under the prior occurrence-based poli-
cy, except that the clause will be interpreted to preclude coverage in cases in which
the insured intentionally discharges a known pollutant, irrespective of whether the
resulting property damage was intended or expected." Morton, 629 A.2d at 875. Sig-
nificantly, the court further clarified that the clause would not operate to preclude
coverage in the event that the insured's predecessor in interest intentionally polluted.
Id
191. Morton, 629 A.2d at 873 (quoting Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 255 A.2d 208,
219 (N.J. 1969)) (emphasis added). For arguments in support of estoppel theory as
applied to insurance contracts, see Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Vari-
ance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 977-85 (1970).
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CGL policy language is nonnegotiable, so insureds rely on the
regulators to protect their interests.' Therefore, the reliance of
the regulators on the representations made by the insurance
industry would be imputed to insureds.93
Although the Supreme Court of New Jersey is the only high
court which has explicitly invoked the estoppel theory in order to
construe the pollution exclusion in favor of coverage, other courts
have used the clause's drafting and regulatory history as extrin-
sic evidence of ambiguity and of the reasonable expectations of
the insured, and concluded that such evidence mandates a pro-
coverage construction.' 4 No court has reviewed the drafting
and regulatory history of the pollution exclusion clause and con-
cluded that such history supports the interpretation urged by
insurers. Courts which place a pro-insurer construction on the
pollution exclusion have done so in spite of the regulatory and
drafting history, rigidly clinging to the plain meaning rule, and
refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties
because the court has deemed the language of the policy to be
"unambiguous" on its face. 5
Not only is such a rigid position out of date with modern con-
tract law,96 it is completely irrelevant to an application of es-
toppel theory. Estoppel is an equitable principle based on reli-
ance and assuring justice and fairness. It is not subject to con-
tract law concepts such as the plain meaning rule.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, in construing the
pollution exclusion, did consider reliance when it rejected the
insured's estoppel argument. Incredibly, the court proffered that,
even if insurers misrepresented the pollution exclusion clause
before the Minnesota Insurance Commissioner, it was unreason-
able for the Commissioner to have relied on the representa-
tions. 97 What is the converse of this proposition? That the in-
surance commissioner can reasonably expect insurance industry
representatives to perjure themselves in commission hearings?
The Minnesota court's view notwithstanding, it would be un-
192. Morton, 629 A.2d at 875.
193. Id. Therefore, an individual insured, in order to benefit from the court's
holding in Morton, need not make a showing that it relied on, or even had knowled-
ge of, the representations made by the insurance industry in 1970 regarding the
pollution exclusion.
194. See, e.g., Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493,
500 (W. Va. 1992).
195. See supra note 144.
196. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.




conscionable to allow insurers to deny coverage for protection for
which it ostensively collected premiums from policyholders based
on misrepresentations made to regulatory authorities in 1970,
and therefore courts should be willing to exercise their equitable
powers and estop insurers from benefitting from such misrepre-
sentations to the detriment of policyholders.
C. Public Policy
1. The Fallacy of the Public Policy Arguments Against Coverage
Insurers argue that by strictly construing the pollution exclu-
sion clause against coverage, policyholders will take more care to
avoid pollution with the knowledge that the financial responsibil-
ity for any resulting damage to the environment will be borne
exclusively by the policyholder. 9 ' This is often referred to as
controlling the "moral hazard" of pollution." Often, courts
which have adopted a pro-insurer interpretation of the pollution
exclusion are under the mistaken impression that such an inter-
pretation will further public policy by discouraging polluting
behavior."o
198. See Erwin E. Adler & Steven A Broiles, The Pollution Exclusion: Imple-
menting the Social Policy of Preventing Pollution Through the Insurance Policy, 19
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1251 (1986).
199. See Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1166-
67 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (using the moral hazard theory in support of a temporal
interpretation of "sudden," yet conceding that abruptness "is an imperfect mecha-
nism" for identifying intentional polluters and "presumably has little if any bearing"
on controlling the moral hazard).
200. See, e.g., Charter Oil, 69 F.3d at 1166 (proffering that if the court allowed
recovery, "insureds will be tempted . . . to engage in harm-generating (or reckless)
behavior i.e., will be subject to 'moral hazard.); Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22
F.3d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that adopting a strict reading of the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion "further[s] public policy by ex-
cluding deliberate indifference on the part of a polluting insured."); Waste Manage-
ment of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (N.C. 1986) ("[I]f an
insured knows that liability incurred by all manner of negligent or careless spills
and releases is covered by his liability policy, he is tempted to diminish his precau-
tions and relax his vigilance."); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597
N.E.2d 1096, 1103 (Ohio 1992) ("[A pro-coverage] interpretation might encourage the
polluter to be less than diligent, as merely negligent acts would be covered under
the policy."), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 987 (1993).
See especially the comments by the dissenter on the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin from a pro-coverage interpretation of the pollution exclusion, overstating his
case quite a bit in stating:
There is no longer any reason for an owner to carefully operate a dump site
because under the language of this policy as construed by the majority, all
negligently caused damages are now covered, as long as the damages are not
deliberate, or are unintentional, or are unexpected, even though pollution dis-
charges from a landfill site most likely can be expected.
1118 Vol. 34:1083
However, such an argument is completely inapplicable to an
interpretation of the "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion,
because the clause has not been part of the standard CGL policy
since 1986. Courts interpreting the pollution exclusion clause
today are evaluating its applicability to the conduct of policyhold-
ers (or their predecessors in interest or their third party contrac-
tors) which took place during the relevant policy period, generally
confined to the years 1970 through 1986.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Georgia was astute in recogniz-
ing that current and future CGL policyholders are no longer
operating with coverage provided under policies containing the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion."0 ' The court stat-
ed:
[The insurer] argues that [the pro-coverage] interpretation of the policy
language contravenes public policy because it encourages the land owner
to keep his head in the sand-to remain oblivious to ongoing polluting
activities on his land.... [But] many events.., have taken place be-
tween the date of this policy and the present lawsuit.... In short, the
situation has changed so that our decision [to allow coverage] is not likely
to have any serious impact on prospective behavior [of policyholders].
Further, even pollution insurance covering prospective policy-
holder conduct is not against public policy. Quite to the contrary,
a showing of financial responsibility by waste management and
petroleum storage facilities is required by EPA regulations, which





In reality, insurance ultimately covers a very small fraction of
an insured's environmental cleanup liabilities, creating no dis-
incentive to diligent environmental practices. For example, a
recent study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice found that
insurers reimburse PRP's for about eight percent of all
Superfund-related expenditures.2
Even assuming that insureds received 100% reimbursement for
their cleanup liabilities, in today's world, there are incentives
unrelated to insurance which encourage industrial policyholders
to practice environmentally sound waste management and chemi-
cal handling practices.
Most notably, not only do federal and state environmental laws
Just v. Land Reclamation, Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Wis. 1990) (Steinmetz, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
201. Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 689-90 (Ga. 1989).
202. Claussen, 380 S.E.2d at 690 (emphasis added).
203. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.140-.151, 280.90-.116 (1995).
204. 18 SUPERFUND SITEs, supra note 43, at 56.
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create cleanup liability, but they also impose civil and criminal
penalties-including fines and imprisonment-on parties who fail
to follow detailed and complex regulations designed to prevent
future pollution."5 Since fines and penalties are intended to
have a punitive effect and deter undesirable behavior, many
jurisdictions hold them uninsurable as a matter of public poli-
cy,' and certainly no insurance policy operates as a get-out-of-
jail-free card.
Further, a company's environmental practices have a signifi-
cant impact on its corporate image because much information
regarding its environmental performance is available to the pub-
lic. For example, the above described fines and penalties are a
matter of public record. Also, under federal and state community
right-to-know laws, a company is required to disclose to the pub-
lic and the government specific information on its spills and
releases of toxic chemicals.2"7 Additionally, federal securities
laws and regulations also require detailed disclosure of a
company's environmental liabilities for the benefit of inves-
tors."' With all this public disclosure, an industrial insured has
an interest in assuring that it is perceived to be a good corporate
citizen and not a polluter. A recent survey by Walker Research
shows that the decisions of consumers, employees and investors
are all influenced by a company's perceived record on social re-
sponsibility issues, including environmental matters.2"
Finally, because of the breadth of CERCLA's liability scheme,
an industrial insured has an interest in assuring that its real
205. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988) (civil and criminal enforcement under
the Solid Waste Disposal Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994) (civil and criminal en-
forcement under the Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(civil and criminal enforcement under the Clean Air Act).
206. See, e.g., In re Texas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Cov-
erage Litig., 870 F. Supp 1293, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that penalties im-
posed by environmental agencies are not insurable under Pennsylvania and New
Jersey law, but can be insurable under Texas law), affld on other grounds, 15 F.3d
1230 (3d Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Texas E. Transmission Corp. v. Fidelity & Ca-
sualty Ins. Co. of N.Y., 115 S. Ct. 291 (1994). See Michael A. Pope, Punitive Dam-
ages: When, Where and How They are Covered, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 539 (1995).
207. See, e.g., The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of
1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). For a survey of the state
community right-to-know laws, see DONALD W. STEVER & ELIZA A. DOLIN, 3 ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW & PRACTICE ch. 6A (1995).
208. See Lisa J. Sotto, Companies that Fail to Make Adequate Disclosure of Po-
tential Environmental Liabilities under Superfund Have Become the Objects of In-
creased SEC Scrutiny, NAT. L. J., Dec. 4, 1995, at B5 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.101,
.103., .303 (information in registration statements) and id. § 240.10b-5 (1995) (anti-
fraud provision)).
209. See WALKER RESEARCH, CORPORATE CHARATER-IS DRIVING COMPETITIVE
COMPANIES. WHERE'S IT DRIVING YOURS? (1994).
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estate remains clean in order to protect its marketability. Today,
environmental considerations affect every industrial real estate
transaction, and pollution often adversely affects an owner's
ability to mortgage, sell or lease property.21
2. Public Policy Arguments in Favor of Coverage: Good
Insurance Policy and Good Environmental Policy
An accurate compass of current public policy on the pollution
exclusion is the position taken by the states in their capacity as
guardians of the public interest. This compass consistently points
toward a pro-coverage interpretation. For example, state attor-
neys general who have submitted amicus briefs in pollution ex-
clusion litigation have uniformly promoted the position of the
policyholder-that the exclusion should be interpreted narrowly
in favor of coverage. 21 Further, at least two state insurance
commissioners have recently initiated regulatory reforms de-
signed to protect policyholders with environmental claims."2
There are two important public policy goals promoted by a pro-
coverage interpretation of the pollution exclusion-one makes for
210. See Jeffrey M. Moss, Comment, Impact of CERCLA on Real Estate Trans-
actions: What Every Owner, Operator, Buyer, Lender, ... Should Know, 6 B.Y.U. J.
PuB. L. 365 (1992).
211. See Dimmitt Chevrolet v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Corp., 636 So. 2d 700,
714 (Overton, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing) (citing amicus brief filed
by the Attorney General of Florida); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co.,
629 A.2d 831, 855 (N.J. 1993) (citing amicus briefs filed by the Attorneys General of
New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Indiana), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2764 (1994). See also Salisbury, supra note 65, at 410-14 app. B (listing 26
amicus briefs filed by governmental entities in support of policyholders in environ-
mental coverage litigation as of 1991).
212. Irene C. Warshauer et al., States Initiate Environmental Insurance Re-
forms, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 6, 1995, at C9. The Louisiana Insurance Commissioner is
considering a proposal to abolish the use of the absolute pollution exclusion in that
state, citing a study by his agency which "revealed that the 1970 and 1985 exclu-
sions are 'being used [by the insurance industry] in a manner inconsistent with
[their] intent and historical purposes.' Id. (quoting Letter from C. Noel Wertz, Sr.,
Attorney to Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance James H. Brown, to Les
Hammond, ISO (Aug. 12, 1994)) (second alteration in original).
In 1995, the Washington Insurance Commissioner adopted regulations govern-
ing the process by which environmental coverage claims are handled, designed to re-
direct resources from disputing such claims to cleaning up the environment. See
WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 284-20-200, 284-30-900 to -940 (1995). The regulations, the
first of their kind in the nation, were supported by small businesses, farmers and
environmentalist groups, but opposed by the insurance industry. See Alex P. Fryer,
Pollution Insurance Rules Provoke Fierce Debate, PUGET SOUND BUS. J., Feb. 17,
1995, at 9; Testimony of Deputy Insurance Commissioner George W. Taylor Before
the Joint Administrative Rules Review Committee (Aug. 22, 1995).
See also infra note 214 (discussing New York's 1982 policy change towards
the pollution exclusion).
Comments1996 1121
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 34:1083
good insurance policy and the other makes for good environmen-
tal policy.
First, a pro-coverage interpretation of the pollution exclusion
based on the regulatory history of the clause would encourage
candor on the part of the insurance industry when representing
the intended effect of new policy language. Courts that refuse to
entertain the compelling extrinsic evidence of the industry state-
ments before state regulators are de facto rewarding the industry
for their misrepresentations in 1970, thereby encouraging similar
future conduct. The Attorney General of Florida feared just such
an effect when he argued that:
[T]he important public policy of protecting Florida consumers from mis-
leading coverage representations would be reduced to a sham if insurers
were permitted to characterize the pollution exclusion as a mere clarifica-
tion in order to obtain regulatory approval and then characterize it in
court papers as a radical reduction in coverage 23 years later at the point
of claim. To protect the integrity of Florida's regulatory scheme, insur-
ers... should be held to the formal explanations made to the Florida
Insurance Department, which represents the interests of Florida citizens
in approving and reviewing form endorsements."1 3
Second, a pro-coverage interpretation of the pollution exclusion
clause is good environmental policy because it provides more
resources for the daunting task ahead of cleanup, which is esti-
mated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.2"' A pro-cov-
erage interpretation will also serve to control transaction costs by
redirecting insurers' resources from disputing environmental
claims to indemnifying cleanup. 5
The strict liability scheme of CERCLA is often criticized as
flawed and unfair.216 In theory, it purports to be a "polluter
pays" system, but in practice, it is really a "deep pocket pays"
213. Dimmitt, 636 So. 2d at 714 (Overton, J., dissenting from order denying
rehearing) (quoting amicus brief filed by the Attorney General of Florida).
214. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
Indeed, the State of New York recognized the important role of insurance in
environmental cleanup in 1982 when it reversed its earlier policy towards environ-
mental insurance. Previously, in 1971, the New York State Legislature had passed a
law making the pollution exclusion clause mandatory in all insurance policies.
Hurwitz & Kohane, supra note 121, at 379 (citations omitted). The purpose of the
law was to discourage intentional polluters. Id. However, the law was repealed in
1982, with a statement by then Governor Hugh Carey: "As we increasingly rely on
the private sector to treat, store and dispose of hazardous wastes in a safe and
environmentally sound manner, we must insure that the public health is safeguarded
from the adverse consequences of failures and accidents for which insufficient funds
are available to remedy." Id. at 379-80 & n.6 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
215. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exces-
sive transaction costs involved in disputing environmental liability.
216. See Anderson, supra note 37.
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system."7 Superfund's definition of PRP fails to take into ac-
count the hard truth: We have seen the polluter and the polluter
is us. "Us" includes the industrial firms which realized increased
profits from inexpensive pre-1980 waste disposal practices, their
suppliers who benefitted from a profitable and stable customer
base, their employees whose livelihoods depended upon company
viability, the consumer who benefitted from better and cheaper
products, and yes, the insurers who collected premiums for CGL
policies that were represented to provide coverage for uninten-
tional pollution damage.
All of these parties must do their share. Industrial policyhold-
ers do their share through the CERCLA liability scheme. Individ-
uals do their share through higher taxes and costs passed onto
consumers through product pricing. The insurers must also do
their share and should not be given a special dispensation from
this important shared responsibility.
The insurance industry has demonstrated itself to be some-
what unwilling to meet this responsibility, not only in the liti-
gious stance that it takes on environmental claims, but also in
the position that it takes on congressional Superfund reform. The
entire insurance industry advocates the repeal of retroactive
liability prior to 1987." Coincidentally, 1987 is the year after
the insurance industry introduced the absolute pollution exclu-
sion in the standard CGL policy. 9 In effect, under such a re-
form, the insurance industry's responsibility for Superfund clean-
up is effectively eliminated-liability for pre-1987 occurrences is
eliminated under the statutory repeal and liability for post-1987
occurrences is eliminated under the absolute pollution exclusion.
Although perhaps somewhat unwilling, current data shows
that the insurance industry is not completely unprepared to meet
this responsibility. In 1994, the A.M. Best Company had ex-
217. The insurance industry also recognizes that Superfund liability is only
"polluter pays" in theory and not in practice. See Reform of Superfund Act of 1995:
Hearings on H.R. 2500 Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment of
the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(testimony of the American Insurance Association), available in Westlaw, 1995 WL
655210 (F.D.H.C.) [hereinafter AIA Testimony].
218. AIA Testimony, supra note 217.
219. This coincidence has not gone unnoticed by other stakeholders in the
Superfund debate. See Reform of Superfund Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 2500 Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Water Resources and Environment of the House Comm. on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Karen
Florini, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund), available in Westlaw, 1995
WL 655211 (F.D.C.H.); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Haz-
ardous Materials of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(testimony of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, EPA), available in westlaw, 1995 WL 423251 (F.D.C.H.).
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pressed concerns over the domestic insurance industry's ability to
fund its ultimate environmental liabilities.22 ° However, due to a
combination of reduction in estimates of ultimate cleanup costs
and an acceleration in industry reserve funding, A.M. Best now
estimates that the domestic insurance industry has already re-
served 38% of its ultimate environmental liabilities, and projects
that it will be able to accrue the remainder of those reserves well
in advance of ultimate payout.22'
CONCLUSION
Billions of dollars in environmental coverage claims remain at
stake in the jurisdictions that have yet to interpret the scope of
the pollution exclusion. Courts that have yet to address the issue
should reverse the trend of pro-insurer decisions of the last few
years and interpret the clause in favor of coverage. The insurers'
key to favorable decisions has been perpetuating the mechanical
application of the plain meaning rule-long abrogated by modern
contract scholars-to the exclusion of persuasive extrinsic evi-
dence supporting a pro-coverage interpretation.
The insurance industry is large, well-organized, legislatively
exempt from most antitrust laws and effective in promoting its
interests. The courts, therefore, in applying well-recognized con-
tract principles and rules of equity, must be effective in protect-
ing the interests of policyholders. Such interests coincide with
those of the public at large who benefit from the integrity of the
insurance regulatory system, as well as from a cost-effective
national environmental cleanup program.
Melody A. Hamel
220. BEsT REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
221. Id. at 4-5 & exhibit 2.
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